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ng time and can affect other system performance metrics. Repositories should also
consider the obsolescence of any and all hardware components within the repository system
as potential trigger events for migration. Increasingly, long-term, appropriate support for
system hardware components is difficult to obtain, exposing repositories to risks and
liabilities should they choose to continue to operate the hardware beyond the manufacturer or
third-party support warranties. Repositories will likely need t |
o perform media migration off
of some types of media onto better supported media based on the estimated lifetime of
hardware support rather than on the longer life expected from the media. It is important that
the process include a check that the copying has happened correctly.
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5.1.1.6 The repository shall have identified and documented critical processes that
affect its ability to comply with its m |
andatory responsibilities.
Supporting Text
This is necessary in order to ensure that the critical processes can be monitored to ensure that
they continue to meet the mandatory responsibilities and to ensure that any changes to those
processes are examined and tested.
Examples of Ways the Repository Can Demonstrate It Is Meeting This Requirement
Traceability matrix between processes and mandatory requirements.
Discussion
Examples of critical processes include data management, access, archival storage |
, ingest, and
security processes. Traceability makes it possible to understand which repository processes
are required to meet each of the mandatory responsibilities.
5.1.1.6.1 The repository shall have a documented change management process that
identifies changes to critical processes that potentially affect the repository’s ability to
comply with its mandatory responsibilities.
Supporting Text
This is necessary in order to ensure that the repository can specify not only the current
processes, but |
the prior processes that were applied to the repository holdings.
Examples of Ways the Repository Can Demonstrate It Is Meeting This Requirement
Documentation of change management process; assessment of risk associated with a process
change; analysis of the expected impact of a process change; comparison of logs of actual
changes to processes versus associated analyses of their impact and criticality.
Discussion
Examples of this would include changes to processes for data management, access, archival |
storage, ingest, and security. The really important thing is to be able to know what changes
were made and when they were made. Traceability makes it possible to understand what was
affected by particular changes to the systems. If unintended consequences are later
discovered, then having this record may make it possible to reverse the changes or at least to
document the changes that were introduced. Change management is a component of the
broader topic of configuration management described by ISO 10 |
007:2003 which includes
configuration
management
planning,
configuration
identification,
change
control,
configuration status accounting and configuration audit. Configuration Management efforts
should result in a complete audit trail of decisions and design modifications.
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5.1.1.6.2 The repository shall have a process for testing and evaluating the effect of
changes to the repository’s critica |
l processes.
Supporting Text
This is necessary in order to protect the integrity of the repository’s critical processes such
that they continue in their ability to meet the repository’s mandatory requirements.
Examples of Ways the Repository Can Demonstrate It Is Meeting This Requirement
Documented testing procedures; documentation of results from prior tests and proof of
changes made as a result of tests; analysis of the impact of a process change.
Discussion
Changes to critical systems should be, |
where possible, pre-tested separately, the expected
behaviors documented, and roll-back procedures prepared. After changes, the systems should
be monitored for unexpected and unacceptable behavior. If such behavior is discovered the
changes and their consequences should be reversed. Whole-system testing or unit testing can
address this requirement; complex safety-type tests are not required. Testing can be very
expensive, but there should be some recognition of the fact that a completely open regime
w |
here no changes are ever evaluated or tested will have problems.
5.1.2 The repository shall manage the number and location of copies of all digital
objects.
Supporting Text
This is necessary in order to assert that the repository is providing an authentic copy of a
particular digital object.
Examples of Ways the Repository Can Demonstrate It Is Meeting This Requirement
Random retrieval tests; validation of object existence for each registered location; validation
of a registered location for each ob |
ject on storage systems; provenance and fixity checking
information; location register/log of digital objects compared to the expected number and
location of copies of particular objects.
Discussion
A repository can have different preservation policies for different classes of objects,
depending on factors such as the producer, the information type, or its value. Repositories
may require a different number of copies for each class, or manage versions needed to meet
access requirements. There may be a |
dditional identification requirements if the data integrity
mechanisms use alternative copies to replace failed copies. The location of each digital
object must be described such that the object can be located precisely, without ambiguity.
The location can be an absolute physical location or a logical location within a storage media
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or a storage subsystem. Provenance information about copying and mov |
ing the data must be
maintained/updated, including the identification of those responsible. This is necessary in
order to track chain of custody and assert that the repository is providing an authentic copy of
a particular digital object. The repository must be able to distinguish between versions of
objects or copies and identical copies. This is necessary in order that a repository can assert
that it is providing an authentic copy of the correct version of an object.
5.1.2.1 The repository shall hav |
e mechanisms in place to ensure any/multiple copies of
digital objects are synchronized.
Supporting Text
This is necessary in order to ensure that multiple copies of a digital object remain identical,
within a time established as acceptable by the repository, and that a copy can be used to
replace a corrupted copy of the object.
Examples of Ways the Repository Can Demonstrate It Is Meeting This Requirement
Synchronization workflows; system analysis of how long it takes for copies to synchronize;
pro |
cedures/documentation of synchronization processes.
Discussion
The disaster recovery plan should address what to do should a disaster and an update
coincide. For example, if one copy of an object is altered and a disaster occurs while the
second is being updated, there needs to be a mechanism to assure that the copy will be
updated at the first available opportunity. The mechanisms to synchronize copies of digital
objects should be able to detect bit corruption and validate fixity checks before
synch |
ronization is attempted.
5.2
SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT
5.2.1 The repository shall maintain a systematic analysis of security risk factors
associated with data, systems, personnel, and physical plant.
Supporting Text
This is necessary to ensure ongoing and uninterrupted service to the Designated Community.
Examples of Ways the Repository Can Demonstrate It Is Meeting This Requirement
Repository employs the codes of practice found in the ISO 27000 series of standards system
control list; risk, threat, |
or control analysis.
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Discussion
The repository should conduct regular risk assessments and maintain adequate security
protection in order to provide expected and contracted levels of service, following codes of
practice such as ISO 27000.
‘System’ here refers to more than IT systems, such as hardware, software, communications
equipment and facilities, and firewalls. Fire protection and flood detec |
tion systems are also
significant, as are means to assess personnel, management, and administration procedures,
resources, as well as operations and service delivery. Loss of income, budget and reputation
are significant threats to overall operations as is loss of mandate. On-going internal and
external evaluation should be conducted to assess quality of service and relevance to user
community served and periodic financial audits should be secured to ascertain ethical and
legal practice and maintenanc |
e of required operating funds. Intellectual property rights
practices should also be reviewed regularly as well as the repository’s liability for regulatory
non-compliance as applicable. The repository should assess its staff’s skills against those
required in the evolving digital repository environment and ensure acquisition of new staff or
retraining of existing staff as necessary. Regular risk assessment should also address external
threats and denial of service attacks and loss of or unacceptable q |
uality of third party
services. The repository may conduct overall risk assessments with tools such as
DRAMBORA.2
5.2.2 The repository shall have implemented controls to adequately address each of
the defined security risks.
Supporting Text
This is necessary in order to ensure that controls are in place to meet the security needs of the
repository.
Examples of Ways the Repository Can Demonstrate It Is Meeting This Requirement
Repository employs the codes of practice found in the ISO 27000 series of |
standards; system
control list; risk, threat, or control analyses; and addition of controls based on ongoing risk
detection and assessment. Repository maintains ISO 17799 certification.
Discussion
The repository should show how it has dealt with its security requirements. If some types of
material are more likely to be attacked, the repository will need to provide more protection,
for instance. Repositories that have experienced incidents could record such instances,
including the times when systems |
or content were affected and describe procedures that have
been put in place to prevent similar occurrences in the future. Repositories may also conduct
2 See http://www.repositoryaudit.eu/.
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a variety of disaster drills that may involve their parent organization or the community at
large. Contingency plans are especially important and need to be test |
ed, updated, and revised
on a regular basis.
5.2.3 The repository staff shall have delineated roles, responsibilities, and
authorizations related to implementing changes within the system.
Supporting Text
This is necessary in order to ensure that individuals have the authority to implement changes,
that adequate resources have been assigned for the effort, and that the responsible individuals
will be accountable for implementing such changes.
Examples of Ways the Repository Can Demonstrate It Is Mee |
ting This Requirement
Repository employs the codes of practice found in the ISO 27000 series of standards;
organizational chart; system authorization documentation. Repository maintains ISO 17799
certification.
Discussion
Authorizations are about who can do what: who can add users, who has access to change
metadata, who can access audit logs. It is important that authorizations are justified, that staff
understand what they are authorized to do, that staff have required skills associated with
variou |
s roles and authorizations, and that there is a consistent view of this across the
organization.
5.2.4 The repository shall have suitable written disaster preparedness and recovery
plan(s), including at least one off-site backup of all preserved information together with
an offsite copy of the recovery plan(s).
Supporting Text
This is necessary in order to ensure that sufficient backup and recovery capabilities are in
place to facilitate continuing preservation of and access to systems and their cont |
ent with
limited disruption of services.
Examples of Ways the Repository Can Demonstrate It Is Meeting This Requirement
Repository employs the codes of practice found in the ISO 27000 series of standards; disaster
and recovery plans; information about and proof of at least one off-site copy of preserved
information; service continuity plan; documentation linking roles with activities; local
geological, geographical, or meteorological data or threat assessments. Repository maintains
ISO 17799 certific |
ation.
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Discussion
The level of detail in a disaster plan, and the specific risks addressed need to be appropriate
to the repository’s location and service expectations. Fire is an almost universal concern, but
earthquakes may not require specific planning at all locations. The disaster plan must,
however, deal with unspecified situations that would have specific consequences, such as
lack of access |
to a building or widespread illness among critical staff. In the event of a
disaster at the repository, the repository may want to contact local and/or national disaster
recovery bodies for assistance. Repositories may also conduct a variety of disaster drills that
may involve their parent organization or the community at large.
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ANNEX A
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
(INFORMATIVE)
A1 INTRODUCTION
|
The use of the Audit and Certification Recommended Practice has several potential areas of
security concern.
One security concern is the possibility that the repository is fooled into undergoing an audit
by someone unqualified or even malicious.
Another concern involves the possible release of confidential information which is collected
as evidence by the auditor.
A2 SECURITY CONCERNS WITH RESPECT TO THE CCSDS DOCUMENT
The repository may ask someone to perform an audit using this Recommended Practic |
e.
There is a possibility that the person contacted is not in fact the person that the repository
believes him or her to be. Alternatively the correct person may be contacted but in fact
another, possibly malicious, person may turn up to perform the audit.
In the process of collecting evidence for the various metrics the auditor may collect
information which is confidential or sensitive, for example details of security weaknesses.
There is a danger that such information may fall into the wrong hands |
and expose the
repository to increased risk. Alternatively in the process of collecting evidence the repository
system may be damaged.
While these are all valid security concerns, they fall outside the purview of this
Recommended Practice, which applies only to the metrics which an auditor should use for
auditing a repository.
A3 POTENTIAL THREATS AND ATTACK SCENARIOS
Impersonation of an auditor and/or release of confidential information could both result in
exposing the repository and its holdings |
to increased risk and loss of reputation of the
repository.
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A4 CONSEQUENCES OF NOT APPLYING SECURITY TO THE TECHNOLOGY
While these security issues are of concern, they are out of scope with respect to this
document. This document aims to provide the basis for an audit and certification process for
assessing the trustworthiness of digital repositories. Providing protection against false
auditors mus |
t rely on the repository’s identification and authorization systems. Protection
against loss of confidential information in the possession of the auditor must be provided by
the security system of that auditor and the method of transmission of information which is
agreed between the repository and auditor. Protection against damage to the repository or its
holdings during an audit must rely on the security and safety systems of the repository.
AUDIT AND CERTIFICATION OF TRUSTWORTHY DIGITAL REPOSITO |
RIES
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ANNEX B
REFERENCES
(INFORMATIVE)
[B1] D. Waters and J. Garrett. Preserving Digital Information. Report of the Task Force
on Archiving of Digital Information. Washington, DC: CLIR, May 1996.
[B2] Trusted Digital Repositories: Attributes and Responsibilities. An RLG-OCLC Report.
Mountain View, CA: RLG, May 2002.
[B3] Trustworthy Repositories Audit & Certification: Criteria and Checklist. Version 1.0.
Chicago: CRL, February 2007.
[B4] Produce |
r-Archive Interface Methodology Abstract Standard. Recommendation for
Space Data System Standards, CCSDS 651.0-M-1. Magenta Book. Issue 1.
Washington, D.C.: CCSDS, May 2004.
[B5] XML
Formatted
Data
Unit
(XFDU)
Structure
and
Construction
Rules.
Recommendation for Space Data System Standards, CCSDS 661.0-B-1. Blue Book.
Issue 1. Washington, D.C.: CCSDS, September 2008.
[B6] The Data Description Language EAST Specification (CCSD0010). Recommendation
for Space Data System Standards, CCSD |
S 644.0-B-3. Blue Book. Issue 3.
Washington, D.C.: CCSDS, July 2009.
[B7] Data Entity Dictionary Specification Language (DEDSL)—Abstract Syntax
(CCSD0011). Recommendation for Space Data System Standards, CCSDS 647.1-B-
1. Blue Book. Issue 1. Washington, D.C.: CCSDS, June 2001.
[B8] “Digital Preservation Management: Implementing Short-Term Strategies for Long-
Term Problems.” Digital Preservation Management Resources. Cornell University.
[B9] Quality Management Systems—Fundamentals and Vocabula |
ry. International
Standard, ISO 9000:2005. 3rd edition. Geneva: ISO, 2005.
[B10] Information Technology—Security Techniques—Code of Practice for Information
Security Management. International Standard, ISO/IEC 17799:2005. 2nd edition.
Geneva: ISO, 2005.
[B11] Information
and
Documentation—Records
Management—Part
1:
General.
International Standard, ISO 15489-1:2001. Geneva: ISO, 2001.
[B12] Information and Documentation—Records Management—Part 2: Guidelines.
International Standard, I |
SO/TR 15489-2:2001. Geneva: ISO, 2001.
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[B13] Trustworthy Information Systems Handbook. Version 4. Saint Paul, Minnesota:
Minnesota Historical Society, July 2002.
[B14] Ron Ross, et al. Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information
Systems. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-
53A. Gaithersburg, Maryland: NIST, July 2008.
[B15] Susanne Dobra |
tz, Astrid Schoger, and Stefan Strathmann. “The nestor Catalogue of
Criteria for Trusted Digital Repository Evaluation and Certification.” Journal of
Digital Information 8, no. 2 (2007).
|